Learning in a Post-Truth World by Mostagir, Mohamed & Siderius, James
Learning in a Post-Truth World
Abstract
Misinformation has emerged as a major societal challenge in the wake of the 2016 U.S. elec-
tions, Brexit, and the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the most active areas of inquiry into misin-
formation examines how the cognitive sophistication of people impacts their ability to fall for
misleading content. In this paper, we capture sophistication by studying how misinformation
affects the two canonical models of the social learning literature: sophisticated (Bayesian)
and naive (DeGroot) learning. We show that sophisticated agents can be more likely to fall
for misinformation. Our model helps explain several experimental and empirical facts from
cognitive science, psychology, and the social sciences. It also shows that the intuitions de-
veloped in a vast social learning literature should be approached with caution when making
policy decisions in the presence of misinformation. We conclude by discussing the relation-
ship between misinformation and increased partisanship, and provide an example of how
our model can inform the actions of policymakers trying to contain the spread of misinfor-
mation.
1 Introduction
Misinformation has become an inextricable component of how people learn about the world
and make decisions. Persistent disagreement over objective facts is becoming increasingly com-
monplace (Alesina et al., 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2020), leading to the assertion that we currently
live in a post-truth, “alternative facts” world (McIntyre, 2018). This makes it particularly difficult
when society faces a collective action problem whose outcome depends on a substantial pro-
portion of the population agreeing to take a specific action, e.g., vaccination or wearing a mask.
Indeed, Loomba et al. (2021) show that in the U.S. and U.K., an average decline of 6.2 percentage
points in the acceptance of the COVID-19 vaccine is directly attributable to misinformation.
What makes people believe false claims? A growing empirical and experimental literature
argues that it depends on their cognitive sophistication.1 Pennycook and Rand (2018) show that
more sophisticated agents are less likely to fall for misinformation. At the same time, there is
1From Tappin et al. (2020): “indicators of cognitive sophistication [can include] educational attainment, science
literacy, numeracy, specific topic knowledge, and a propensity for analytic thinking.” This is also correlated with
performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (Pennycook and Rand, 2018). Pennycook et al. (2021) show that getting
people to think more carefully about the accuracy of the news they read can lead to better discernment of false
information.
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ample evidence that sophisticated agents are more likely to disagree over objective facts.2 This
presents an interesting puzzle: if sophisticated agents are more likely to learn the truth, then
why do we observe more disagreement within that group over what the truth is? Competing
explanations argue that this disagreement arises from political polarization and partisan bias
(e.g., Taber and Lodge (2006); Taber et al. (2009); Kahan et al. (2017)), or can simply be explained
as an outcome of unbiased Bayesian reasoning (e.g., the recent experiments in Tappin et al.
(2020)).
In this paper, we present a simple model that helps explain and reconcile the above empirical
findings. These findings cannot be explained using classic social learning results, which until
recently,3 were developed under the assumption that agents learn from organic news that can be
inaccurate but contains no deliberate misinformation. Our results depart from the conventional
wisdom of social learning and economic modeling in general — that the rational economic agent
is the standard against which all agent models should be measured.4 Our model therefore serves
as a foundation for further theoretical and experimental work that integrates misinformation
into social learning, and can also be used to inform policy decisions on these issues.
We capture sophistication heterogeneity by studying how misinformation affects the two
canonical models of the social learning literature: Bayesian (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2011, 2014))
and naive (DeGroot) learning (e.g., Golub and Jackson (2010)). In these models, agents try to
uncover an underlying state of the world, e.g., whether a vaccine is safe or not, and do so by
learning from news they receive as well as by exchanging opinions with each other. Bayesian
agents employ their sophisticated reasoning abilities before they accept a piece of news as fac-
tual, whereas DeGroot agents simply aggregate the information they receive into their beliefs
without much deliberation. In the presence of misinformation, which of these two agent types
is more likely to mislearn?
Theorem 1 answers this question (and reconciles the empirical literature) by allowing us to
think about learning as a function of agent sophistication and the amount of misinformation in
the system. When there is little or no misinformation, we recover the classic result that sophisti-
cated agents learn better than naive ones.5 As the amount of misinformation increases, we enter
2This relationship between increased cognitive sophistication and disagreement is widely documented across
multiple issues; see for example Drummond and Fischhoff (2017); Kahan et al. (2012); Hamilton et al. (2015).
3For recent work that incorporates misinformation into the study of learning, see Allon et al. (2019); Candogan
and Drakopoulos (2020); Papanastasiou (2020); Mostagir et al. (2021); Mostagir and Siderius (2021); Acemoglu et al.
(2021).
4For a recent example in a social learning context, Dasaratha et al. (2020) measure how well naive learning per-
forms by comparing it to the Bayesian benchmark.
5This agrees with the hypothesis that more sophisticated agents are more likely to learn in the presence of misin-
formation, as documented empirically in Bronstein et al. (2019); Bago et al. (2020); Pennycook and Rand (2018) and
a wealth of other literature.
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a relatively unexplored territory where naive agents outperform sophisticated agents, who can
no longer agree on what the true state is.6 This result is slightly ironic given that the interest in
studying DeGroot agents stems from the critique that Bayesian agents possess reasoning abil-
ities that are unrealistic to demand of the average person. Theorem 1 shows that this learning
superiority falls apart once there is enough misinformation in the system.
Underlying these diverging outcomes is the fact that the role of misinformation extends be-
yond corrupting the news that agents receive. For the Bayesians agents, the mere knowledge
that there is misinformation in the system allows them to spin narratives that justify their ex-
isting positions. A post-truth world emerges where the presence of evidence to the contrary of
one’s beliefs is rationally dismissed as misinformation, and learning is hampered as a result.
This is not the case for the DeGroots, who simply include any new information into their beliefs
without worrying about its accuracy. This makes them vulnerable to misleading information,
but they also benefit from not being paranoid about whether every piece of information is cor-
rect or not. This “openness” can allow them to learn better than the Bayesians, who develop a
form of endogenous stubbornness that stops them from learning. As a result, increased sophisti-
cation can lead to less learning and more disagreement as agents “dig in their heels” and refuse
to move from their existing positions.
We remark that the above result is similar to the findings of Tappin et al. (2020), which suggest
that sophisticated agents disagree as a result of unbiased Bayesian behavior and not partisan
bias. Our model allows us to comment more broadly on the polarization debate (see Osmund-
sen et al. (2020); Tappin et al. (2020)): does an increase in polarization and partisan bias lead
to more disagreement over objective facts? Theorem 3 shows that in the presence of enough
misinformation, an increase in polarization breaks down Bayesian learning, but can leave De-
Groot learning unaffected and in some cases even make these simpler agents better off. This
means that studies that measure the impact of polarization on susceptibility to misinformation
should account for agent sophistication and the amount of misinformation in the system, oth-
erwise they risk leaving out important confounding factors. This extends to policies that target
specific agents in the population (for example, through educational outreach) in order to stop
misinformation. Proposition 3 shows that the question of whom to target has different answers
depending on the sophistication level of society: a planner should target agents with moderate
beliefs in a DeGroot society, but focus her efforts on the extremists in a Bayesian one.
6This in turn is consistent with the empirical findings that more sophisticated agents are more likely to disagree,
as shown in Drummond and Fischhoff (2017); Kahan et al. (2012); Hamilton et al. (2015).
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2 Model
Time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. There is a true and unknown state of the world θ ∈ {L,R} indicat-
ing whether a left-leaning or right-leaning idea is correct. There are N agents in the population
who are trying to learn θ to make an informed binary decision after a long horizon T . At time
t, agent i’s belief that θ = R is given by πi,t. Agents start out at t = 0 with heterogeneous ideo-
logical beliefs πi,0, which are drawn independently from a continuous distribution H(·). Agents
with beliefs πi,0 < 1/2 are (initially) left-leaning, while those with beliefs πi,0 > 1/2 are (initially)
right-leaning.
Agents receive independent information (messages) about θ at t = 1 and then interact with
others to try and learn θ. Some of the messages come from organic news, with mi ∈ {L,R}.
These messages are correlated with the state; in particular P[mi = θ] = p > 1/2. News may also
contain misinformation that is orthogonal to the state. Agents cannot discern whether a given
message contains misinformation or not. The probability that a message contains misinforma-
tion is q < 1/2, i.e., most news is organic. Agents are aware of the existence of misinformation
(they know q), but do not know how this misinformation is broken down along the two possible
states, i.e., they do not know the proportion of misinformation arguing for L vs. the proportion
of misinformation arguing for R. This follows the empirical observation in van der Linden et al.
(2020) that shows that while people agree about the existence of misinformation and even its
extent, they do not agree on whether this misinformation leans more left or right. Let r denote
the proportion of misinformation on the right. We assume that r is drawn from a differentiable
distribution r ∼ F (·) at t = 0 and is independent of θ. We assume that F has full support7 on
some interval [r, r̄] and no support8 outside of this interval.9 Similarly, we assume the distribu-
tion of prior beliefsH has full support over [π, π̄] and no support outside of it. In other words, we
assume the supports of all distributions are convex.
We consider two types of populations: Bayesian and DeGroot. Bayesian agents learn about
θ by updating their beliefs in a fully Bayesian way, whereas DeGroots use simple learning heuris-
tics. We use 1θ=R to denote the indicator function of θ = R (i.e., 1θ=R is equal to 1 when θ = R
and 0 when θ = L).
(i) Bayesian Society: At t = 1, each Bayesian agent forms a posterior update about the state,
7We define full support of a distributionG on an interval [a, b] as having its density g satisfy the following property:
there exists µ > 0 such that g(α) > µ for all α ∈ [a, b].
8No support over a setAmeans the distribution G draws an element fromAwith probability 0.
9While this does not rule out full support of F on [0, 1], this more general assumption allows us to capture the
effect of relatively symmetric vs asymmetric prevalence of misinformation.
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πi,1, given the article with message mi and knowing misinformation may exist:
πi,1(mi = R) = E[1θ=R|mi = R] =
∫ 1
0
p(1− q)πi,0 + qr
p(1− q)πi,0 + (1− p)(1− q)(1− πi,0) + qr
f(r) dr
πi,1(mi = L) = E[1θ=R|mi = L] =
∫ 1
0
(1− p)(1− q)πi,0 + qr
(1− p)(1− q)πi,0 + p(1− q)(1− πi,0) + qr
f(r) dr
For all t ≥ 1, every Bayesian agent i:
(i) Observes the time-(t− 1) posteriors of agents j 6= i in society, {πj,t−1}j 6=i.
(ii) Based on the observations of {πj,t−1}j 6=i, updates her prior πi,t−1 to form time-t poste-
rior πi,t about θ in a fully Bayesian way.
Thus, at t = 1 every Bayesian agent sees the priors of other agents {πj,0}j 6=i and her message
mi. Becausemi is the only relevant information for θ at t = 1, every Bayesian agent updates
using only mi, as described above. For all t ≥ 2, agents form Bayesian posterior estimates
about the state, πi,t, given their article with message mi and all previous posteriors in the
population {πj,τ}j 6=i, τ≤t−1, fully aware that there may be misinformation in the system.
This is akin to the updating process in Acemoglu et al. (2016), where agents are uncertain
about the underlying message distribution.
(ii) DeGroot Society: DeGroot agents are boundedly rational agents who use a learning heuris-
tic to learn θ. At t = 1, each DeGroot agent updates her belief of the state using Bayes’ rule
taking the news at face value, i.e., assuming there is no misinformation in the system. This
is similar to how these agents update their beliefs in Jadbabaie et al. (2012)):
πi,1(mi = R) = E[1θ=R|mi = R, q = 0] =
pπi,0
pπi,0 + (1− p)(1− πi,0)
(1)
πi,1(mi = L) = E[1θ=R|mi = L, q = 0] =
(1− p)πi,0
(1− p)πi,0 + p(1− πi,0)
(2)
For all t ≥ 2, every DeGroot agent i:
(i) Observes the time-(t− 1) beliefs of agents in the population, {πj,t−1}j 6=i.
(ii) Based on these observations, takes an average of her time-(t− 1) belief and the beliefs
of other agents in society, i.e., πi,t = 1N
∑N
j=1 πj,t−1. This forms DeGroot agent i’s time-t
belief, πi,t, about the state θ.
Learning. At time T  0,10 agent i chooses a binary terminal action ai ∈ {L,R} that minimizes
10The learning horizon need only satisfy T ≥ 2 in our model. However, our results generalize to learning in other
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her quadratic loss Eπi,T [(ai − 1θ=R)2], i.e., she chooses the action that matches the state that she
believes is more likely. This corresponds to, for example, getting vaccinated (if she believes the
state is L and the vaccine is safe) or not (if she believes the state isR and the vaccine is harmful).
We follow the standard definition of learning (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2011)) and say that society
learns if all agents take the correct action at time T (i.e., ai = θ); otherwise, society mislearns.
Throughout, we assume the population of agents is large in the sense that N →∞.
3 Illustrative Example
We present an example to show that agents who use simple learning heuristics can learn better
than fully-rational agents in the presence of misinformation. For concreteness, we fix θ = L as
the true state (which, by assumption, is unknown to the agents). We also assume the misinfor-
mation ideological split r is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], i.e., the split is ex-ante symmetric
for left-leaning and right-leaning misinformation. Agents do not know the exact value of r, but
they know that it comes from the uniform distribution on (0, 1). We compare the following two
settings:
Setting A: Weak Organic Messages and No Misinformation. Consider the baseline case studied
throughout the social learning literature. There is no misinformation, i.e., q = 0, and p = 0.54, so
that 54% of organic messages align with θ = L. In this setup, organic news is (weakly) correlated
with the truth.
Do agents learn the correct state (almost surely) when the population is large? The short
answer, as already developed in a vast literature, is yes. Both agent types correctly learn that
the true state is L. This happens regardless of their initial prior beliefs (i.e., even those on the
extreme right still learn that the correct state is L) and despite the fact that news is weakly corre-
lated with θ. In this setup, both the Bayesian and DeGroot societies take the correct action.
Setting B: Misinformation with Stronger Organic Messages. In this setting, misinformation
exists in the system, with q = 0.25. On the other hand, organic news is of higher quality, with
p = 0.6. For this example, assume that r = 0.64, i.e., 64% of the misinformation advocates for
θ = R and 36% advocates for θ = L. This means that among the large collection of messages
{mi}Nj=1, roughly 54% correspond to L (i.e., p(1 − q) + (1 − r)q) and 46% correspond to R (i.e.,
(1 − p)(1 − q) + qr). This distribution is identical to the one in Setting A, under which agents
settings, such as networked learning, where agents may not necessarily see the beliefs of all agents in every time
period. One can reduce the learning outcomes in these more general environments to learning in complete networks,
but with a longer learning horizon (see DeMarzo et al. (2003) for how to do this in a Bayesian setting, and Golub and
Jackson (2010) for a DeGroot setting).
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Figure 1. Two narratives that give rise to equivalent observations. In this example, the true state
is L and most of the misinformation comes from the right with r = 0.64, i.e., the left narrative
is the correct one. However, agents who hold right-leaning beliefs can rationalize their observa-
tions as coming from the right narrative, with the organic information arguing forR and most of
the misinformation coming from the left, with r = 0.04.
were able to correctly learn. In Setting B, if agents did not know misinformation exists, learning
will proceed exactly as before and everyone will take the correct action despite the presence of
misinformation. However, agents are now aware that there is misinformation in the system.
Given this, we analyze how each society updates its beliefs.
Bayesian agents: Agents observe the initial beliefs πj,0. At t = 1, each Bayesian agent i forms
a posterior belief πi,1 based on mi as mentioned in Section 2. Observe that πj,1 > πj,0 if and
only if mi = R and πj,1 < πj,0 if and only if mi = L. Thus, by observing beliefs in the second
period, every agent i can deduce the messages {mi}Nj=1. As noted, When N is large, the law of
large numbers guarantees that roughly 54% of the messages that agent i observes will favor L.
Note that there are exactly two realizations of r for which 54% of the messages are L and 46%
are R. The first is the true realization, where θ = L and r = 0.64. The other is where θ = R
but r = 0.04 (i.e., only 4% of the misinformation is on the right). This situation is depicted
in Figure 1. Because r is uniformly distributed, both of these scenarios are equally likely. This
implies that πj,2 = πj,0 because the messages provide no information about the state θ. In other
words, right-leaning agents spin a narrative that the vast majority of misinformation is on the
left, and cannot use the massive quantity of news to change their views. Similarly, left-leaning
agents do the same, believing (correctly, in their case) that most of the misinformation must be
on the right. The society of Bayesians does not learn and there is persistent disagreement about
θ in the population.
DeGroot agents: DeGroot agents take messages at face value and use them to update their beliefs
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(via Equations (1) and (2)) using p = 0.6. Thus, noting that 54% of messages are L and 46% of





+ .54 · .4α
.4α+ .6(1− α)
)
dα = 0.495 < 1/2
so all agents in society learn the correct state, in contrast to the Bayesians.
Likelihood of Mislearning. We used a specific misinformation split r = 0.64 in the above exam-
ple for simplicity. Other values of r would give rise to different outcomes. Instead of focusing
on a specific realization of r, we can instead look at the likelihood that society does not learn
when the split r is randomly drawn from its true (uniform, in this example) distribution. How do
Bayesian agents perform relative to DeGroot agents on average?
It turns out that in this case, Bayesian agents mislearn twice as much as DeGroots (probabil-
ity that Bayesians mislearn is 40% vs. 20% for the DeGroots – see Appendix B.1 for calculations).
We characterize this ratio as a function of the distribution of r in Theorem 2. Generally, while
Bayesian agents thrive in environments where information is organic, they are much more vul-
nerable to mislearning and taking the wrong action in the presence of misinformation.
4 Learning in Bayesian vs. DeGroot Societies
In this section, we generalize the previous example and investigate the conditions under which
learning breaks down in each society. We follow this up with two technical results. Theorem 1
characterizes when Bayesians learn worse than DeGroots as a function of the amount of misin-
formation in the system, and Theorem 2 quantifies how much worse they learn as a function of
the distribution of that misinformation.
4.1 DeGroot (Mis)learning: Propaganda for the Incorrect State
DeGroot agents update their beliefs about the state by averaging the opinions of others. Because
of this simple updating process, they always converge to a (possibly incorrect) consensus about
what the true state is. When there is no misinformation (i.e., q = 0), agents will learn the correct
state and choose ai = θ (see Golub and Jackson (2010)). When misinformation is present, we
can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for DeGroot learning in terms of the ideological
split of misinformation r:
Proposition 1. When θ = L, there exists a threshold r∗D such that if r < r
∗
D, the DeGroot society
learns and if r > r∗D, the DeGroot society mislearns.
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Figure 2. Two narratives that justify the same observed message distribution under a specific
misinformation split r. Agents do not know r but they know that it follows a triangular distribu-
tion. This makes them believe that the more likely narrative is the one that corresponds to the
true state being R. In this case, all agents move further to the right and away from the correct
state.
Proposition 1 shows that failure of learning depends on whether propaganda for the incor-
rect state is sufficiently high to direct agents away from the belief that the organic news argues
for. Agents learn as long as this propaganda does not overpower organic news.
4.2 Bayesian (Mis)learning: Rationalization and Competing Narratives
Bayesian agents make inferences about the state by observing the distribution of messages in
the population. They then rationalize the values for the misinformation split r that gives rise
to this message distribution. We refer to these values as narratives. There can be at most two
narratives: one that corresponds to θ = L and one that corresponds to θ = R. Only one of these
narratives is correct, and agents will stick with the narrative that fits their beliefs.11 However,
there can also be a single correct narrative, in which case all agents learn the true state θ. This
again depends on the extent of misinformation arguing for the incorrect state:
Proposition 2. When θ = L, there exists a threshold r∗B such that if r < r
∗
B , a single narrative
exists and the Bayesian society learns.
If r > r∗B , then two narratives exist. Figure 2 shows this situation for a specific r > r
∗
B value.
Recall that agents do not know r, but in this example they know that it follows a triangular dis-
11This is reminiscent of the effect informally described by the Today show co-host Al Roker, commenting on con-
flicting results of science experiments: “I think the way to live your life is you find the study that sounds best to you
and you go with that.”
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tribution. This makes them believe that the more likely narrative is the one corresponding to R.
In this case, all agents move further to the right (and away from the true state). Note that un-
like the example in Section 3, where the two competing narratives were equally likely under the
uniform distribution, the triangle distribution makes the incorrect narrative strictly more likely.
Section 4.4 shows how to quantify the likelihood of mislearning as a function of the hazard rate
of the distribution of r.
4.3 Low vs High Misinformation Regimes
Next, we present our main theorem, which analyzes the settings under which DeGroot or Bayesian
agents mislearn more often:
Theorem 1. Suppose H is symmetric about 1/2.12 Then there exists a threshold q∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that:
(i) If q < q∗, the Bayesian society mislearns with lower probability than the DeGroot society;
(ii) If q > q∗ and H and F have full support on [0, 1], the Bayesian society mislearns with strictly
higher probability than the DeGroot society.
Theorem 1 establishes that when the amount of misinformation is not too large, Bayesian
agents can still learn better than their DeGroot counterparts. This is the classic intuition from the
social learning literature and the one empirically observed in Bronstein et al. (2019); Bago et al.
(2020); Pennycook and Rand (2018). On the other hand, once misinformation becomes more
rampant, DeGroot agents become more adept at aggregating the organic information compared
to the Bayesians, who find themselves in consistent disagreement over what the truth is, as in the
empirical work of Drummond and Fischhoff (2017); Kahan et al. (2012); Hamilton et al. (2015).
The intuition for Theorem 1 is as follows. When misinformation is relatively low, the organic
news is enough for Bayesians to infer the true narrative and see the misinformation as purpose-
fully deceptive. On the other hand, with DeGroot agents, this misinformation still has a chance
of successfully steering the beliefs of the population away from the truth. Once the amount
of misinformation becomes large, a post-truth effect kicks in for the Bayesians: any reasonable
narrative can be told about the source of misinformation, and disagreement over the true state
ensues. While DeGroots are not guaranteed to learn either, their simple updating tends to work
12This corresponds to a society where every belief on the left is perfectly mirrored by a belief on the right of the same
extremity. This allows us to analyze both the θ = L and θ = R cases identically and abstracts away from scenarios
where society begins either initially biased toward or away from the correct state, in order to focus on the underlying
learning mechanisms.
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well when misinformation is not too heavily skewed in one direction or another. Thus, in more
instances, the DeGroot society is able to learn from the organic news while allowing the misin-
formation on both sides to nearly “wash out.” We can quantify how much better the DeGroots
do in this case, which is the subject of the next section.
4.4 High Misinformation and Mislearning Rates
When q > q∗, we observe in Theorem 1 that DeGroot agents learn more effectively than Bayesian
agents. This section is for readers who are interested in quantifying the extent with which De-
Groots outperform Bayesians. This depends on the misinformation split distribution F (·). We
formalize this as follows. The exact difference in rates of mislearning between Bayesian and De-
Groots in the high-misinformation regime (i.e., q > q∗) is determined by the hazard rate λF (α)
of F . Recall that the hazard rate is given by λF (α) =
f(α)
1−F (α) , where f(·) is the density of cumu-
lative distribution function F . Denote by µ the the relative frequency of DeGroot to Bayesian
mislearning (which by Theorem 1 is less than 1), then we can characterize how µ changes as a
function of the strength of organic signals p (i.e., whether agents can learn from strongly infor-
mative content):
Theorem 2. Suppose that H and F have full support on [0, 1] and q > q∗ as in Theorem 1(b).






.13 The ratio µ is increasing in p if λF (α) < 2λF (α−
β), decreasing in p if λF (α) > 2λF (α− β), and unchanging if λF (α) = 2λF (α− β).
Informally, Theorem 2 states that Bayesians perform comparatively worse than DeGroots
when misinformation is more evenly distributed. The reason is that while Bayesians are adept at
making inferences about the possibility of strongly misleading misinformation, misinformation
that is relatively balanced on both sides permits more rationalization of narratives and more
disagreement. On the other hand, more balanced misinformation is always better for DeGroot
learning because it permits greater likelihood of overall balanced news and less propaganda for
the incorrect state. Appendix B.3 shows how to apply this result when r comes from skewed or
unskewed distributions.
5 Polarization
Polarization and political partisanship have been steadily increasing (see Pew Research Center
(2014) for evidence from the United States). As noted in the introduction, a substantial literature
13Note that it can be shown 0 ≤ α− β ≤ α ≤ 1, so the hazard rates are well-defined everywhere.
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Figure 3. Polarization of beliefs captured through parameter γ.
advocates that increased polarization makes people more likely to disagree over objective facts
because of politically-biased reasoning, whereas new findings (see Tappin et al. (2020)) suggest
that this disagreement can be explained as a byproduct of sophisticated (Bayesian) reasoning
and not partisan bias.
Our model lends support to the latter explanation by showing that disagreement can natu-
rally arise from Bayesian updating. More generally, Theorem 3 highlights the fact that attempts
to establish a connection between partisanship and disagreement should take into account the
sophistication level of the agents and the amount of misinformation in the system. As misinfor-
mation becomes more prevalent, increased polarization leads to failure of learning in Bayesian
societies, but leaves DeGroot societies relatively unaffected. Thus, measuring the effects of po-
larization on learning and consistent disagreement without incorporating these elements can
lead to seemingly contradictory evidence.
We operationalize polarization as follows: consider some symmetric (about 1/2) belief distri-
butionH (density h) with support [π, π̄] and a mean-preserving spread ofH to some H̃γ (density
hγ) defined as:











. One can think of γ as a measure of belief
polarization in society. For larger γ, π + (π − 1/2)γ is closer to 0 when π < 1/2 and closer to
1 when π > 1/2; thus, the probability of realizing “tail” beliefs grows when γ increases. (Note
that 1/(1 + γ) is simply a scaling factor to guarantee the
∫ 1
0 h̃γ(π) dπ = 1.) A simple example of
increasing polarization for a truncated normal distribution of beliefs is given in Figure 3.
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Our next result establishes a threshold result for polarization and its consequences to both
Bayesian and DeGroot mislearning:
Theorem 3. Let H be symmetric about 1/2 and q > q∗. There exists a threshold γ∗ such that if
γ < γ∗, the DeGroot society mislearns more often than the Bayesian society, whereas if γ > γ∗, the
DeGroot society mislearns less often than the Bayesian society.
In Bayesian societies, an increase in belief polarization always hurts learning. Mean-preserving
spreads necessarily create more tension in the learning process because agents cannot agree on
what is likely to be the true narrative. The impact is more mild on DeGroot agents because
they communicate and update beliefs by taking averages of their neighbors. In this case, mean-
preserving spreads do not affect their general ability to aggregate organic information, even
when they start from very different initial beliefs.
Remark – Note that when H is asymmetric, polarization still always hurts Bayesian societies
(see the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix A). However, it is possible that in this case polarization
improves the chances of learning in a DeGroot society (see Appendix B.2 for an example). This
occurs because when society is initially well-informed, additional polarization pulls initial opin-
ions towards the correct and incorrect states. However, the convexity of how agents update their
beliefs from news (see Equations (1) and (2)) leads to an overall movement towards the correct
state. This fails in Bayesian societies because of persistent disagreement about the truth, and
further accentuates the result of Theorem 3 that polarization is more damaging to a Bayesian
society than a DeGroot one.
Targeting Policies. We now consider the problem of a planner who can target a subset of the
population with information arguing for one state over the other. One can think of this policy as
an educational outreach intervention. For example, governments have been ramping up their
efforts to convince citizens to vaccinate against COVID-19, and a part of these efforts is targeted
advertising. The question is which agents should the planner target? For example, should she
target the most polarized agents? We show that the answer, again, crucially depends on the level
of sophistication of the agents.
Formally, the planner informs a small but positive measure of agents that the correct state
is either L or R. We assume the agents interpret this information in the same way they do
news: combined with the message mj that agent j receives, she also gets the planner’s message
mpj ∈ {L,R} and updates using both messages. The next result describes the planner’s targeting
policy:
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Proposition 3. There exists 1/2 < π∗ < 1 such that the targeting policy for DeGroot agents is to
target those agents whose beliefs lie in an open interval containing π∗ (and bounded away from 1).
The policy for Bayesians agents is to target those agents whose beliefs are farthest from the truth,
i.e., the extremists.
Proposition 3 states that in a DeGroot world with θ = L, the planner wants to influence right-
leaning moderates, as these are the agents who change their belief most when seeing message
L. Extremists in this society mostly dismiss messages that don’t agree with their priors, and the
planner has little to gain by targeting them. However, with Bayesian agents, extremists are exactly
the agents that the planner needs to target. While the efficacy of her work is limited, these are
the agents who are most inclined to spin narratives that anchor them to the incorrect state.
Remark – Proposition 3 recommends a policy when the planner knows the true state, but the
insights generalize when the planner herself is uncertain about what the state actually is. In a
DeGroot society, the planner tries to make relatively moderate agents (of both ideologies) more
moderate. In Bayesian societies, the planner tries to make the extremists (of both ideologies)
move toward the center.
6 Final Remarks
As argued recently in Watts et al. (2021), accurate information is very much a prerequisite for
successful democratic discourse. The Internet and social media have made it easier to dissem-
inate misinformation (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017), with far-reaching consequences.14 There
are ongoing efforts across multiple disciplines to try and uncover the mechanisms by which
misinformation spreads. In this paper, we contribute to these efforts by examining misinforma-
tion through the lens of social learning and focusing on agents’ sophistication types. While the
learning mechanisms of these types have been studied in a broad context, they have not been
analyzed and compared when there is rampant misinformation. We show a reversal of results
and intuitions that hold in many normative learning setups, but not in the presence of misin-
formation. We do this through a parsimonious framework whose results reconcile several em-
pirical studies and whose predictions show the need for researchers and policymakers to jointly
consider sophistication and social learning as integral components in studying the spread of
misinformation.
14Examples range from individual actions along the lines of Pizzagate (Fisher et al., 2016), to belief in the “Death
Panels” of the Affordable Care Act (Watts et al., 2021), to more collective action failures like the spread of measles in
Eastern Europe as a result of Russian disinformation (Broniatowski et al., 2018).
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We first provide two auxillary lemmas that we use in the proofs of our main results.
A.1 Auxiliary Lemmas
Recall thatH is the distribution of prior beliefs in the population and p is the strength of organic
news (likelihood a message corresponds to the true state θ). For misinformation, q denotes the
amount of misinformation in the system, r denotes how much of this misinformation argues for
state R, and F is the distribution of r.
Lemma 1. LetH be symmetric. If θ = L, the DeGroot society mislearns if and only if r ≥ (1−2(1−
q)(1− p))/(2q); if θ = R, the DeGroot society mislearns if and only if r ≤ (1− 2(1− q)p)/(2q).
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove this for θ = L; the case of θ = R is similar. For a fixed realization





((1− p)(1− q) + qr) pα
pα+ (1− p)(1− α)
+ (p(1− q) + q(1− r)) (1− p)α
(1− p)α+ p(1− α)
)
h(α) dα









(1− p+ qr) pα
pα+ (1− p)(1− α)
+ (p+ q(1− r)) (1− p)α








pα+ (1− p)(1− α)
− (1− p)α







(p− α(2p− 1))((1− p) + α(2p− 1))
h(α) dα
Note that all expressions are positive because p > 1/2. The only non-trivial one to verify is the
first expression in the denominator, which is linear in α and thus it is sufficient to verify it is non-
negative for all α ∈ {0, 1} to prove it is non-negative for all α ∈ [0, 1]. When α = 0 it is equivalent
to p and when α = 1 it is equivalent to 1− p.
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2((1− p)(1− β) + pβ)
h(1− β) dβ
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By symmetry of H , we know that h(1 − β) = h(β), thus the above expression simplifies to∫ 1/2
0 h(α) dα = 1/2 because H is symmetric and
∫ 1
0 h(α) dα = 1. Similarly, because dπ∞/dr > 0,
we know whenever r > r̃, π∞(r) > 1/2 and so agents elect action ai = R, and the society mis-
learns. Whenever r < r̃, π∞(r) < 1/2 and so agents elect action ai = L, and the society does
learn.
Lemma 2. If H has full support and θ = L, the Bayesian society mislearns if and only if r ≥
r + (2p−1)(1−q)q ; if θ = R, the Bayesian society mislearns if and only if r ≤ r̄ −
(2p−1)(1−q)
q .
Proof of Lemma 2. Once again, we prove this θ = L and remark that the case of θ = R is similar.
Unlike Lemma 1, we prove both the “if” and “only if” parts separately:
(i) If part : Suppose r ≥ r+ (2p−1)(1−q)q . There is some proportion ρL of messages that advocate
for L and some proportion ρR = 1− ρL of messages that advocate for R.
When θ = L, p(1 − q) proportion of the messages are both organic and advocate for L,
i.e., mi = L, when the population is large. Similarly, q(1 − r) proportion of messages are
inorganic (“misinformation”) and advocate for L as well. Call this scenario 1.
When θ = R, (1− p)(1− q) proportion of the messages are both organic and advocate for L,
with once again, q(1− r) proportion of messages that are inorganic and advocate for L too.
Call this scenario 2.
Both scenarios occur with positive probability if there exist some r1 and r2, both within
[r, r̄], where both scenarios yield the same realized distribution ρL and ρR. In scenario 1 we
admit ρ1L = p(1 − q) + q(1 − r1) and in scenario 2 we admit ρ2L = (1 − p)(1 − q) + q(1 − r2).
Because θ = L, we know that r1 = r and scenario 1 occurs with positive probability. To see if
scenario 2 occurs with positive probability, one needs to find the existence of r2 ∈ [0, 1] such
that p(1−q)+q(1−r) = (1−p)(1−q)+q(1−r2). When r2 = 1 and since p(1−q)+q(1−r) >
(1 − p)(1 − q), there exists a value for r2 where the left-hand side is greater than the right-
hand side. Moreover, the left-hand side is decreasing in r2, so verify there exists some r2
where equality can be obtained, it is sufficient to have p(1− q)+ q(1−r) ≤ (1−p)(1− q)+ q.
Rearranging gives the condition in the lemma.
Finally, we note that under this condition, both scenario 1 and scenario 2 occur with prob-




η2πi,0 + η1(1− πi,0)
Taking πi,0 sufficiently close to 1 yields πi,2 > 1/2, and given H has full support, implies
some positive fraction of the Bayesian population mislearns, so society fails to learn as
well.
(ii) Only if part : Suppose r < r + (2p−1)(1−q)q . Then by the same argument in the “if” proof,
there exists no value for r2 such that p(1− q) + q(1− r) = (1− p)(1− q) + q(1− r2) because
p(1− q) + q(1− r) > (1− p)(1− q) + q(1− r2) for all r2 ∈ [r, r̄]. Thus, there exists a unique
value for r that yields message distribution ρL (scenario 1) and it necessarily corresponds
to θ = L. Note that:
πi,2 =
η2πi,0
η2πi,0 + η1(1− πi,0)
= 0
given that η1 > 0 and η2 = 0, and πi,0 ∈ (0, 1) almost surely. Thus, all of the Bayesian agents
learn the correct state θ = L.
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A.2 Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1. We showed in Lemma 1 that dπ∞/dr > 0 without utilizing the symmetry
assumption on H . The DeGroot society mislearns if and only if that π∞(r) > 1/2 when θ = L.
Thus, there is a unique cutoff r∗D such that the DeGroot society mislearns if and only if r > r
∗
D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We showed in Lemma 2 there is a single narrative when r < r∗B ≡ r +
(2p−1)(1−q)
q , which implies the Bayesian society must learn in this setting, as πi,2 = 0 when θ = L.
Proof of Theorem 1. Note by Lemma 1, the DeGroot society mislearns with positive probability
when q > 2p−12p . By the arguments in Lemma 2, given that H may or may not have full support,
a necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) condition for the Bayesian society to mislearn is that
q > 2p−12p−r ≥
2p−1
2p . This establishes part (i) by taking q
∗ = 2p−12p .
For part (ii), when q > q∗ and H and F have full support (so r = 0), the Bayesian society





and by Lemma 1 the DeGroot society mislearns













which is a decreasing function in q and is exactly equal to 0 when q = q∗. Thus, by monotonicity





















implying the Bayesian society mislearns more often.
Proof of Theorem 2. When θ = L, note the ratio of DeGroot mislearning to the ratio of Bayesian





































































It is easy to see that q∗ = 2p−12p from the proof of Theorem 1, and thus α ≡
1−2(1−p)(1−q)
2q and






). Substituting we have that ∂µ/∂p > 0 if and only if
2f(α− β)(1− F (α)) > f(α)(1− F (α− β))
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or in other words, 2λF (α− β) > λF (α), which proves the claim.
A.3 Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Theorem 3. Observe that larger values of γ decrease the lower support of the distribution
H : if π̄ > 1/2 is the upper support for h, then π̄γ = π̄ + (π̄ − 1/2)γ is increasing in γ and when
γ = 0, π̄γ = π̄. Moreover, all values of γ preserve the symmetry of H .
By Lemma 1, and since H is always symmetric, the probability of DeGroot mislearning does
not depend of γ. For Bayesian learning, there is always either one (r < r∗B) or two narratives
(r > r∗B). In the former case, Bayesians always learn. In the latter case, let ηL be the likelihood of
the θ = L narrative and ηR be the likelihood of the θ = R narrative. Then the Bayesian society
mislearns if and only if:
ηRπ̄
ηRπ̄ + ηL(1− π̄)
> 1/2
But note that the left-hand side is increase π̄, so for every realization of r, mislearning can only
become “more likely” as π̄ increases.15 Integrating over all of r shows that the likelihood of
Bayesian mislearning is increasing in π̄ and, in particular, is increasing in γ.
Next observe that when γ = −1, the Bayesian society mislearns with lower probability than
the DeGroot society. To show this, note that when γ = −1, the density h is a Dirac-delta function
at belief π = 1/2. Thus, all Bayesian agents initially agree, so there is a homogenous prior. By
the improvement principle (see, for instance, Golub and Sadler (2017)), Bayesian agents must
be able to outperform the DeGroot heuristic.
Finally, when γ = γ̄, then H has full support on [0, 1], so by Theorem 1(b), we know the
Bayesian society mislearns with higher probability than the DeGroots. By the previous para-
graph, we know that when γ = −1, then the Bayesian society mislearns. Because the mislearning
probability is increasing in γ for Bayesians but constant for DeGroots, there must be a unique
single-crossing γ∗ that determines the phase transition.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove the two parts of the result, which separate into DeGroot and
Bayesian societies. For both, we fix θ = L for concreteness.
(i) DeGroot society: Because we have fixed θ = L, we know that mp = L for targeted agents.
Thus, there are two cases for πi,1 for the DeGroot agent that depend on whether (i) agent i
receives mi = R and mp = L or (ii) agent i receives both mi = L and mp = L. The former
case occurs with probability (1 − p)(1 − q) + qr whereas the latter occurs with probability
p(1 − q) + q(1 − r). In the former, it is easy to verify her belief remains unaffected, i.e.,
πi,1 = πi,0. In the latter case, applying Bayes’ rule we see:
πi,1 =
(1− p)2πi,0
(1− p)2πi,0 + (1− (1− p)2)(1− πi,0)
Thus, the expected belief update of agent i is given by:
E[πi,1|πi,0] = ((1−p)(1−q)+qr)πi,0+(p(1−q)+q(1−r))
(1− p)2πi,0
(1− p)2πi,0 + (1− (1− p)2)(1− πi,0)
15“More likely” is a slight abuse of terminology, because for a given realization of r, the society either learns or does
not almost surely. Formally, we mean that an increase in π̄ can not transition society from mislearning to learning for
this value of r.
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(2− p)(1− p)2(p(1− q) + q(1− r))




When p > 1/2, note that 2p2 − 4p+ 1 < 0, so ∂∆/∂πi,0 is strictly increasing in πi,0, and thus
∆ is strictly convex is πi,0. Moreover, ∆(πi,0 = 0) = 0 and ∆(πi,0 = 1) = 0, so ∆ is maximized
at some unique π∗i,0 ∈ (0, 1). Note that when πi,0 = 1/2, then
∂∆
∂πi,0
(πi,0 = 1/2) = −(1− 2(2− p)p)2(p(1− q) + q(1− r)) < 0
Because ∆′′ > 0 everywhere, this implies that ∆′(π∗i,0(r)) = 0 for some π
∗
i,0(r) > 1/2, which
might depend on r.
Consider the set of agents with belief α = πi,0, denoted by A, who are targeted. Recall that




E[πi,1 |α , mp = L]h(α) dα+
∫
α 6∈A
E[πi,1 |α , mp = ∅]h(α) dα
If A is restricted to have some small measure ν (in prior space h), and the objective is to
minimize π∞ it is clear that the optimal choice of A is top pick an open interval around
π∗i,0(r) given that ∆ is continuous in πi,0.
Finally, note that π∞(r), under the optimal choice of A for each r, is continuous due to
Berge’s theorem of the maximum. Finally, because of continuity and the fact π∞(r) > 1/2
for all r, we know there exists an interval (π∗0, π̄
∗
0) such that for all r, π
∗
0 lies in this inter-
val, with 1/2 < π∗0 < π̄
∗
0 < 1. The probability that DeGroot agents mislearn is given by
Er[1π∞(r)>1/2], and because 1π∞(r)>1/2 is monotone in π∞(r), this implies that the optimal
choice of π∗0 to maximize this expectation also satisfies π
∗
0 > 1/2.
(ii) Bayesian society: We claim that reducing the highest belief πi,0 is equivalent to decreasing
the likelihood of mislearning. Observe that πi,2 (which is equal to πi,T for large T ) is equiv-
alent to decreasing the likelihood of mislearning for Bayesian agents. To see this, note that
for Bayesian agent i, πi,2 is strictly increasing in πi,0, fixing the messages {mi}Ni=1, which
all Bayesians are able to deduce by period 2. Note that if there exists an open interval
(π1, π2) ⊂ [π, π̄] such that all agents with πi,0 ∈ (π1, π2) mislearn, the Bayesian society mis-
learns. By the assumption that [π, π̄] has full support, targeting some open interval nearest
π maximizes the probability of all agents learning when θ = L. Thus, the optimal policy
targets an agent who is most extreme near π.
B Supplemental Material
B.1 Likelihood of Mislearning
We show that Bayesian agents perform worse than DeGroot agents on average. We adopt the
environment from Setting B in Section 3, but we do not focus on a specific realization of the
misinformation split. Instead, we look at the likelihood that society does not learn when we
draw the split r from its true (uniform, in this example) distribution. How do Bayesian agents
perform relative to DeGroot agents on average?
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We track the beliefs of both societies:
Bayesian Population. At t = 1, each Bayesian agent i forms a posterior belief πi,1 based on mi
according to Section 2. Once again, we know that πj,1 > πj,0 if and only if mi = R and πj,1 < πj,0
if and only if mi = L. So every agent i can deduce all of the messages {mj}Nj=1 by period 2.
Among the collection of messages {mj}Nj=1, if the state is θ = L, there are (roughly) p(1− q) +
q(1 − r) proportion of L messages and (1 − p)(1 − q) + qr proportion of R messages, whereas if
the state is θ = R, there are (1− p)(1− q) + q(1− r) proportion of L messages and p(1− q) + qr
proportion of R messages. The state cannot be pinned down if there exists a value r′ ∈ [0, 1]
such that p(1 − q) + q(1 − r) = (1 − p)(1 − q) + q(1 − r′); in this case, there exist exactly two
realizations of r (the true r and another r′) for which the given distribution of messages can be
explained under two different states, θ = L (correct) and θ = R (incorrect). Moreover, because
r is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], both of these scenarios are equally likely. This implies that
πj,2 = πj,0 because the messages provide no information about the state θ; consequently, the
society of Bayesian agents does not learn.
Note that (1− p)(1− q) + q(1− r′) is maximized when r′ = 0; thus it is sufficient to consider
for what values of r the inequality p(1− q) + q(1− r) ≤ (1− p)(1− q) + q holds; this corresponds
to the values of r for which there is mislearning. Rearranging, we see that r ≥ 1− 1−2p(1−q)q = 0.6
when p = 0.6 and q = 0.25. Hence, the Bayesian society mislearns with probability 40% (given
that r is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]) in the setting with 25% misinformation.
DeGroot Population. DeGroot agents update in the same way as before (i.e., via Equations (1)
and (2)) using p = 0.6. Thus, noting that p(1− q) + q(1− r) of the messages are L and (1− p)(1−





(.4(.75) + .25r) · .6α
.6α+ .4(1− α)




Note that π∞(r) is monotonically increasing in r and it can be shown that π∞(r) ≤ 1/2 if and
only if there are less than 50% R messages; thus, π∞(r) ≤ 1/2 if and only if (1 − p)(1 − q) +
qr ≤ 1/2, or in other words, r ≤ 1/2−(1−p)(1−q)q = 0.8. Thus, since DeGroot agents mislearn
the true state only when r ≥ r∗, we see they mislearn 20% of the time, which outperforms the
Bayesian population by a factor of two. Recall that quantifying how much better DeGroots do
than Bayesians in general is formally analyzed in Theorem 2 in the paper.
B.2 Polarization
The next example shows that in some cases, mean-preserving spreads (i.e., more polarization)
can improve the learning outcomes of DeGroot agents.
Example 1. Consider a world where θ = L and as in Section 3, the misinformation is q = 0.25,
so DeGroot societies (as well as Bayesian societies) mislearn with positive probability.
First, suppose H is distributed with a small right bias, as demonstrated in Figure 4a and Fig-
ure 4b. In the more polarized society of Figure 4a, many prior opinions start off initially quite
misinformed, so not much misinformation on the right-side can support learning (i.e., the re-
alization of r must be lower); in particular, r ≤ .281 ≡ r∗ is required to support learning. Next,
consider a decrease in polarization to the Dirac-delta function on the average opinion of H , as
shown in Figure 4b. This increases the threshold of right-leaning misinformation that can be
tolerated for learning to r∗ = .319, and the corresponding probability that learning occurs also
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increases. Because moderate right-leaning agents are the most likely to be influenced by or-
ganic left-leaning news, less polarization helps the DeGroot society learn, as is the case with the
Bayesians.
(a) Right-leaning but polarized society. (b) Right-leaning but non-polarized society.
Figure 4. Two right-leaning distributions of prior beliefs (with the same mean belief), one of
which is polarized and the other is not. The less polarized community mislearns less often be-
cause less evidence is needed to convince moderate right-leaning agents of θ = L.
(a) Left-leaning but polarized society. (b) Left-leaning but non-polarized society.
Figure 5. Two left-leaning distributions of prior beliefs (with the same mean belief), one of which
is polarized and the other is not. The less polarized community mislearns more often because
they are more susceptible to believing right-leaning ideas when right-leaning misinformation is
more pervasive.
Conversely, suppose H is distributed with a small left bias, as demonstrated in Figure 5a and
Figure 5b, so beliefs tend to support the correct state of the world. When (almost all) beliefs are
concentrated just left of center (Figure 5b), there is positive probability of mislearning because
there is some chance that right-leaning misinformation dominates and causes all agents to move
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closer to right-leaning ideas. However, these effects are mitigated when polarization increases,
and learning occurs with probability 1 when it is sufficiently high, as shown in Figure 5a. This is
because strong left-leaning believers are not swayed as much by right-leaning misinformation,
but moderate right-leaning agents can be considerably convinced of left-leaning organic news.
Thus, polarization generally helps when then initial belief distribution is already slanted toward
the correct state. This is somewhat surprising given that additional polarization pushes more
agents toward the incorrect belief of the world. Observe that this stands in contrast to polariza-
tion in Bayesian societies: whereas DeGroots always reach a consensus, and thus polarization
can sometimes nudge the entire society closer to truth (in the aggregate), the ability of Bayesians
to spin multiple narrative impedes consensus in the face of increasing polarization.
B.3 Mislearning Rates with High Misinformation
Let q > q∗. We denote by µ the ratio of the probability of DeGroot mislearning to the probability
of Bayesian mislearning. Recall µ < 1 by Theorem 1 (i.e., the “relative” frequency of DeGroot
to Bayesian mislearning). Low values of µ indicate DeGroots do much better than Bayesians,
whereas relatively larger values indicate Bayesians close the gap in mislearning more. Next, we
try to reason about the conditions under which µ is increasing (i.e., Bayesian agents start pick-
ing up an advantage relative to DeGroot agents) or µ is decreasing (i.e., DeGroots learn more
frequently relative to Bayesians) as a function of the strength of organic signals p and the misin-
formation in the system q. For, this we make the following standard definition of the hazard rate
of a distribution:
Definition 1. The hazard rate λG(α) of a distribution G is given by λG(α) =
g(α)
1−G(α) where g(·) is
the density of cumulative distribution function G.
The hazard rate at point α∗ corresponds the likelihood of the realization α ∈ (α∗, α∗ + dα)
relative to the interval size dα, conditional on α ≥ α∗. Theorem 2 relates the hazard rate at
specific points on the F distribution (local properties of F ) to the sensitivity of µ to p (global
property16 of F ). To gather some intuition for Theorem 2, let us look at three applications:
(i) Uniform distribution: Recall the uniform distribution we assumed forF in Section 3 showed
that when q = 0.25, DeGroot agents mislearn half as often as the Bayesians did. How does
this depend on p? The hazard rate is λF (r) = 11−r , which is increasing in r because the likeli-
hood of falling within an interval of fixed length dr is increasing as one conditions on higher
values of r. Thus, while λF (α− β) < λF (α), it is unclear its relation to λF (α)/2. Some basic
algebra reveals that λF (α − β) = λF (α)/2 for all values of α, β, so µ has no dependence on
p. Thus, DeGroot societies always mislearn half as often as Bayesian ones on the uniform
distribution.
(ii) Unskewed misinformation (Figure 2 in the paper): This distribution of F is one where mis-
information is likely to evenly balanced betweenL andR. Instead of computing the hazard
rate for α and α−β explicitly, we will draw inferences by comparing it to the uniform distri-
bution. When r < 1/2, the hazard rate is given by λF (r) = 4r1−2r2 whereas when r > 1/2, the
hazard rate is given by λF (r) = 4−4r2−4r+2r2 . It is easy to show the ratio of the hazard rate of this
distribution to the uniform distribution is increasing on r < 1/2 and constant on r > 1/2.
16It might appear as though the hazard rate condition in Theorem 2 is still a local property, because we are looking
at local changes in p, but recall that to characterize mislearning probability, one must consider all realizations r that
come from F .
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Thus, 2λF (α − β) ≤ λF (α) and the ratio µ is decreasing in p, meaning that DeGroots do
comparatively better with more precise organic information in an inverted V-distribution
(i.e., the Bayesians are more than twice as likely to mislearn than the Bayesians). The in-
tuition is simple: more moderate misinformation increases the likelihood that Bayesian
agents can spin a narrative to their liking, whereas for DeGroots it corresponds to a greater
likelihood of having balanced misinformation (that washes out), allowing the organic news
to win out.
(iii) Skewed misinformation (inverse of Figure 2 in the paper): Relative to application (ii), the
opposite effect occurs here. When r < 1/2, the hazard rate is decreasing relative to the uni-
form distribution; when r > 1/2, the hazard rate is again constant. This means the opposite
inequality holds (i.e., λF (α) ≤ 2λF (α − β)) and by Theorem 2, the ratio µ is increasing in
p. When the misinformation is more extreme, Bayesians are comparatively more resilient,
and mislearn less than twice as often as their DeGroot counterparts. The high likelihood
of very misleading misinformation is not as well-handled by the DeGroot agents relative
to a Bayesian society. While the Bayesian society can use more extreme misinformation to
dismiss an incorrect narrative, the DeGroot society falls victim to such misinformation.
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